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(Abstract)
Software engineering community is well aware of the usefulness of formal methods
for specifying, designing and testing of the software. Despite this   testing literature
rarely deals with specification based testing. Testing from formal specifications offers
a simple, structured and more rigorous approach to the functional tests than  testing
techniques. An important application of specification in testing is providing test
oracles. The rise of use of computers in control safety critical systems, i.e., flight
control systems, necessitates that rigorous system testing  is performed before the
deployment. In flight control systems, requirements are mostly concerned with the
safety and maneuverability of an aircraft. In this domain, the use of formal
approaches to requirements specification and system verification is strongly
encouraged. In our study relational notation was used to model the requirements of
generic flight control system. The advantage of relational approach is that the
requirements can be partitioned into less complex components. Each component is
separately specified with a set a relations. The formal aspect of the relational notation
is exploited in a verification framework where the specifications are used as an oracle
to test a system implementation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
Software testing is the process of executing a software system to determine
whether it matches its specification and executes in its intended environment. Software
testing is arguably the least understood part of development process [33]. Every software
development organization tests its products, yet delivered software always contains
residual defects of varying severity. Sometimes it's hard to imagine how a tester missed a
particularly glaring fault. Despite the major limitation of testing that it can only show the
presence of errors and never their absences, it will always be a necessary verification
technique.
The software engineering community is aware of the usefulness of formal
methods for specifying and designing software. The accepted role of formal
specifications in program verification is as the basis for proofs of correctness and
rigorous transformation methodologies. However, formal specifications can play an
important role in software testing. Of course, it is not surprising that specifications are
important to software testing; it is impossible to test software without specification of
some kind [38]. As Goodenough and Gerhart [8] noted  that testing based only on
program implementation is fundamentally flawed. Despite this, only a small portion of
the testing literature deals with specification based testing issues. In testing, informal
specification have limited usefulness (but  are still required) but the real benefits are to be
2gained from formal specifications, which are now reaching a level of maturity and
stability.
 In this thesis we examine applications of formal methods to software testing
which offer many advantages for testing. The formal specification of a software product
can be used as a guide for designing functional tests for the product. The specification
precisely defines the fundamental aspects of software, while more detailed and structural
information is omitted. Thus, the tester has the important information about the product's
functionality without having to extract it from implementational details. Testing from
formal specifications offers a simple, structured, and more rigorous approach to the
development of functional tests than standard testing techniques. An important
application of specification in testing is providing test oracles. The specification is an
authoritative description of system behavior and can be used to derive expected results of
the program execution test data.
The rise in use of computers to control safety critical systems, i.e., in reactive
systems and flight control systems, necessitates that rigorous software testing is
performed before deployment . Traditional testing techniques in  validation of concurrent
systems fail as  components interact with each other in several different ways.  For these
type of system alternative certification methodologies are needed based on the
combination of mathematical proof and testing. Using formal methods to specify and
verify high assurance systems is becoming a major thrust as system designs become more
complex. Flight Control Systems (FCS) requirements are mostly concerned with the
safety and maneuverability of an aircraft, and consequently, with the safety of crew and
passengers. In this domain, the use of formal approaches to requirement specification and
3system verification is strongly encouraged. In our study relational notation was used to
model the requirements of generic FCS. The advantages of relational approach are  that
the requirements are partitioned into less complex components. Each component is
separately specified with a set of relations.   The formal aspects of the relational notation
is exploited in a verification framework where the specifications are used as an oracle to
test a system implementation. So the objectives of this study are
1) To demonstrate the issues that need to be considered when using relational notation for
requirement specification
2) To demonstrate the treatment of quantifiers in the relational specification with
reference to testing
3) To build a framework that  exploits relational specification in the verification
environment
1.2 Thesis Outline
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is reviewing the  literature related to
the thesis, providing an understanding of specification based testing , benefits and
limitation of using formal methods in testing, test oracles and the issue of software and
system certification. Chapter 3 is the description of relational approach, how it is used in
testing and description of the quantifiers that can be exploited in testing. Chapter 4
illustrates the application of the approach to the case study 
 
and 
 Adaptive Fault Tolerant
Flight Control System, the tool that was used to create simulation test environment, and
the discussion of the results of  verification. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and points
some to future directions for research on the relation notation. Appendix A contains the
4description of input and output that was required by  the simulator. Appendix B contains
the plain English and  relational requirements for flight control system.
5Chapter 2
Related Work
Software Testing is defined as the process of exercising or evaluating system or a
system component by manual or automated means to verify that it satisfies requirements
or to identify difference between expected and actual results [IEEE89]. Software
engineering community is well aware of the vital role that testing plays in software
development. Testing is a practical means of detecting program failures that can be
highly effective if performed rigorously. Despite the major limitation of testing that it can
only show the presence of faults and never their absences, it will always be a necessary
verification technique. Two basic approaches to software testing are specification based
testing and program based testing.  Research on testing indicates that both approaches are
needful for fault detection [4, 29].
2.1 Program Based Testing
For the long time in the software industry, most software testing experts believed
testing should be based on the code, profiles of the software under test, or on statistics
about the software. The traditional development process is a process in which program
objectives are transformed into program requirements, then into design specifications,
implemented into code, tested and finally placed and maintained in operational status [4].
While this methodology gives the tester an idea of desired behavior, it does not tell the
tester whether software works as specified. To judge if software behaves as expected,
tester must know the requirements on which to base tests and results. Another problem
6with using this methodology at the end of the software lifecycle is that testing is often
forsaken for delivery date commitments. The life span of a software product, however,
realistically involves multiple versions of the software. Over a single production cycle, a
product may have to be tested several times . In many cases, software development and
problem fixing take the majority of the time in the schedule. Often, this means not
enough time is  devoted to  testing [34]. A new testing methodology that resolves some of
the problems started above is
 specification based testing.
2.2 Specification based Testing
Generally, there are two types of specification  operational or model based
specification  describes the system's operating rules.  Descriptive or property based
specification describes the required system properties. A descriptive approach is
especially important during the early phases of the software development when the
objective is to describe precisely what the system must do rather than how system is to be
implemented. Although most formal specifications cannot be classified by purely
operational or descriptive, the difference between the two styles does not suggest their
relative merits. Generally, operational specifications are closer to designer intuition, are
easier to develop, can bias designer towards particular solutions.  On the contrary,
descriptive specifications usually have less implementation bias and they are more
abstract.
Specification based testing is based on a program's requirements.  When the
requirements are specified, the design, coding and testing phases are all based on the
requirement specification. Tests are created directly from the requirements during the
7designing and coding stages rather than after the coding stage. A comparison between
program based testing and specification based testing is shown in the Figure 1.
So, specifications can play an important role in software testing. One can argue that it is
impossible to test software without specification of some kind. As Goodenough and
Gerhart [8] note, testing based only on program implementation is fundamentally flawed.
Despite this, only limited portion of literature deals with specification based testing
issues. Testing on the basis of formal specification is  beneficial when compared with
testing based on  the informal specification because informal specifications are
ambiguous in some situations.
 Formal specifications are of great importance in testing, for they determine what
the software ought to do and must necessarily form the basis for the testing of the
functionality of the software. The following  has been observed by Richardson et. al [24]:
Program Based
Testing
Define                Design         Write                 Debug (Rework) Requirements, Designs,
Requirement     Software         Programs         Programs and Tests
Define Test     Create       Run      Evaluate
Objectives       Tests         Tests     Tests
   ........................Testing................................
Define                Design             Write                 Debug (Rework) Requirements,
Requirement      Software         Programs            Designs ,Programs and Tests
                        Tool Designs   and Write      Tool Run         Tools Evaluate
                         Test Cases                           Test Case          Test Cases
Specification
Based
Testing
.................................................Testing........................................................
Figure 1: Program vs. specification based testing
8'Current software testing practices focus, almost exclusively, on the implementation,
despite widely acknowledged benefits of testing based on software specification.'
Considering information from formal specifications enables testing intended behavior
and actual functionality. Specification based testing techniques may direct attention to
aspects of the problem that have been implemented incorrectly or completely neglected,
while implementation based techniques reveal such aspects by chance.
 Real time systems are often safety critical. Ensuring the correctness of the these
system is very important. Since real time systems are also typically complex , with
behavior depending on the inter-relationships among the timing of the events of the
system, testing is inadequate as the sole means of ensuring the correctness of such
systems. Formal methods offer the hope of guaranteeing the correct behavior of such
systems.  Formal methods  in general,  refer to the development method based on some
formalism. Thus a proof method for proving mathematical correctness cannot be
formulated independently of the algebraic or logical formalism that supports it. Once a
system and its implementation have been stated in a suitable notation, that the system
satisfies the properties  can be proved as a mathematical theorem. The consequence is
that the level of confidence typical of mathematical reasoning can be obtained for
engineering systems. In developing the systems, formal methods can have an impact, in
principle, on any single phase (i.e. specification, implementation etc) as well as on the
whole life cycle. For that different formal methods have been proposed and used, based
on mathematical logic( ASTRAL[Coe 94]; RTL[Jah 86]), graphical notations, state chart
like notations) [Jah 94, Ost 92] , petri -net based tools [Cuk 98] state machine models,
timed automata [Lyn97] and verification based on model checking [Cla 86] and process
9algebra. The use of formal methods in the early phases of software life cycle, i.e.,
specifications are important because of the following reasons:
 The early phases in the system development are the most important  because rest of
the development cycle build on them.
 Despite their importance, the early phases are not well supported by high quality
methods and tools. Moreover unlike later phases, one can rely on good programming
languages and environments, in the early phases , much is left to the designers'
intuition and common sense [6].
In software development formal specification can be used by
 designer, to formulate and experiment with the design of the system,
 implementor,  as a precise description of the system being built, particularly if there is
more than one implementation,
 documentor,  as an unambiguous starting point for user manuals,
 quality control  for the development of validation strategies.
Using  a specification, the designer of a system can reason about properties of the
system before development starts; and during the development, formal verification that
an implementations meet its specification can be carried out. When an existing system is
being specified there are both short and long terms benefits. In short term, defining the
specification uncovers those parts of the system that are either incomplete or inconsistent.
They give insights into anomalies in the existing system and can suggest ways in which
the system could be improved.
In the long term the specification could be used
 for re-implementation of all or part of the system,
10
 as a basis for discussing and developing specifications for changes or additions of the
system,
 to provide a model of the functional behavior of the system suitable for educating
new staff.
Re-implementation may involve a new machine architecture, programming language
or operating system or a restructuring to take advantage of multiprocessor or distributed
system. As the specification is implementation independent, it provides a suitable starting
point for each of the above alternatives when changes or addition to the system are to be
made, new specification can be developed with reference to the previous specification.
These developments will give insights into the effect of the changes and their interaction
with existing part of the system. As the specification is a formal document, it provides a
more precise description for communication between the designers that the natural
descriptions. This should help to reduce the misunderstanding among the people
involved.
Experiments with specification provide a quicker and cheaper method of investigating
a number of alternative changes to the system than implementing the changes. On the
other hand, because the specification is implementation independent, it cannot provide
answer to questions of how difficult the changes will be to implement or their impact on
the performance of the system. However, as it is at high level of abstraction it can give a
better insight into the interaction of changes with other components of the system. It is
just these high level interactions which get lost in the informal specification and in the
detail of implementation. While working predominantly at a more abstract level the
specifiers must be experienced in implementation and should be aware of the
11
implementation consequences of their decisions. Those parts of specifications for which
the implementation consequences are unclear should be further investigated before
detailed implementation is begun.
2.2.1 Benefits and Limitations of Formal Methods
The experience of formal methods in industry and academia suggests that
although formal methods can bring benefits to software development, many limitations
exist. Austin and Parkin [2] summarize the benefits and limitations of formal methods in
terms of safety critical system applications.
The 
 
perceived benefits of using formal methods are:
 Requirements and specifications are unambiguous. The main reason for this is two
folds. The first is that all the variables used in formal specifications are typed and
each type definition is based on the mathematical objects (e.g. natural number, real
number, or boolean value) that have precise semantics. The second reason is that
every operation in formal specification is defined precisely in the sense of its precise
input and output relationship.
 Errors due to misunderstanding are reduced. As formal specifications are
unambiguous, communication between people involved in requirement analysis,
specification construction, design and implementation via the formal specification is
enhanced. Implementations based on formal specification are usually easier that those
based on the informal ones: This is because formal specifications usually present
precise tasks for implementation, whereas informal ones cannot easily do so.
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 Correctness proofs can be carried out, especially for safety critical properties.
Correctness proofs have been recognized as a powerful approach to verifying
implemented software against their specifications. They are especially important for
safety critical applications. Since formal specifications adopt mathematical notation,
correctness proofs become possible.
 Validation of requirement specifications becomes easier. Because of the precision of
formal requirements specifications, every task specified can be precisely interpreted
thus enhancing the clients' ability to scrutinize the correctness of formal requirements
specifications.
 The perceived limitations of the formal methods are:
 Formal specifications are difficult to read. The first reason for this is that the majority
of people working in the computing industry at present are accustomed to traditional f
methods and not well trained in formal notations. The second reason is that
mathematical notations are usually more difficult to understand than informal
descriptions. Two elements contribute to this difficulty. First, mathematical notations
are concise and the information described by them is therefore compact. Second , the
language in which these descriptions are expressed is necessarily terse and populated
with abstractions.
 Formal methods cannot help model all aspects of real world. The difficulty is that the
real world includes static and dynamic aspects while formal methods are a static
technology for dealing with modeling and abstraction. Dynamic aspects may be
13
modeled using formal methods, but the model produced cannot really demonstrate the
dynamic behavior of the  system.
 Correctness proofs are resource- intensive. This is because considerable time is
required to produce formal specifications. Furthermore, since there is intrinsic
difficulty in performing correctness proofs automatically (e.g., assertion construction,
associated knowledge management and efficient use),  proofs have to be done
manually or interactively with machines, which is resource intensive.
 Development cost increase. The main reason for this limitation is that many
companies and projects need to invest more money for training their staff in formal
technology.
 Formal specifications can still contain error. As mentioned earlier formal methods can
help reduce errors due to misunderstanding. However, this is no guarantee that people
will not make mistakes in formal specifications (e.g., syntactic errors and semantic
inconsistency). No formal method so far can provide automatic support to semantic
consistency checking for formal specifications (only some tools for syntax and type
checking are available)
 There is no mechanism available in many popular formal methods for describing time
constraints on a proposed system or a component of the system: The reason for this is
that the initial purpose of some formal methods(e.g. VDM, Z) was not the
development of time critical systems but the development of non time-critical
systems. However, if they are used for time critical applications, it becomes difficult
or impossible to describe timing behaviors.
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 Environments to support the use of formal methods are not readily available. Tool to
support the use of formal methods  merely exist. None of  the existing one is
powerful enough to support the whole activity of using formal methods, such as
consistency checking of specifications, specification refinements, correctness proofs,
software testing etc.
 It is not yet clear how to incorporate formal methods into the whole life cycle of
software development. To solve this problem, there is a need to answer the following
questions: How to construct good quality formal specifications (understandable,
consistent, and structured)? How to refine formal specifications? How to perform
software verification (including correctness proofs and software testing)  in efficient
way? How to write documentation? How to manage a software project ?
To extract maximum out of the use of formal method they should not only provide
rigor and lead to increased system reliability. They must also provide some additional
functionality including:
 Readability: Generally formal documents have been criticized as hard to understand.
To accommodate that problem formal methods should be supplemented with more
intuitive notations such as annotated with explanatory comments. By doing this a
formal document can be understood by those with little technical background.
 Scalability:  The method should scale up from small examples to large, complex real
world systems  and should be maintainable and reusable.
  Tool Support: It is always better if the method can be supported by well-engineered
tools.  Many practically situations are unmanageable without some automation. The
15
basic principle behind this scenario is that user should take care of intuitive part of the
task, while clerical data should be managed by the tool.
The formal specification of a software product can be used as guide for designing
functional tests for the product. The specification precisely defines fundamental aspects
of the software, while more detailed and structural information is omitted. So in zest we
can say that testing from formal specifications offers a simpler, structured, and more
rigorous approach to the development of functional tests than standard testing techniques.
The strong relationship between specification and tests facilitates error pin-pointing and
can simplify regression testing. Other benefits of specification-based testing include
using the derived tests to validate the original specification, simplification of auditing of
the testing process, and developing tests concurrently with design and implementation.
An important application of specifications in testing is providing test oracles. The
specification is an authoritative description of system behavior and can be used to derive
expected results for test data .
2.3 Testing Oracle
 A Test oracle determines whether a system behaves correctly for test execution.
Test oracle provides  a means for determining whether an implementation functions
according to its specification. When a formal specification exists, it is logical to use that
specification as a test oracle. In practice, however, the differences between specification
languages and programming languages prevent the specification from being used directly
16
as an oracle. Thus it is necessary to translate the specification into a form that can be
readily used as testing oracle.
 DAISTS (Data Abstraction, Implementation, Specification and Testing System)
is a system which focuses on using specifications as oracles [36]. The DAISTS approach
is to annotate program code with algebraic specifications of data types and tests. The
specification axioms are translated into code segments which call procedures in the
implementation. The tests specify which axiom they are testing and provide instantiations
for the free variables in the axiom. DAISTS checks that the program implements the
specification for the cases defined in the tests section by constructing implementation
driver from the specification and using the tests as input. This notation of the
specification driving the implementation was extended by Hayes [35], who considered
oracle issues for model-based specifications of abstract data types. Hayes [35] also
showed how the oracle procedures can be derived from Z specifications of abstract data
types to check invariants, pre-conditions and the input-output relationships.
Murray et al [39] identify two types of test oracle. An active oracle implements the
expected behavior of the software under test. A passive oracle checks the behavior of the
software, but does not produce it. Peters and Parnas [21] developed test oracle from the
design documentation. Their oracles were precise and relatively readable, written in
terms of data structure  using a relatively expressive notation. Their generated oracle
meets the following criteria:
 For any test results (input, output pair) the oracle can be used to determine whether or
not the program under test satisfied the specification.
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 It can be used to determine whether or not the specification allows termination for a
particular test case, and if it does, if the program is required to terminate for that case.
 It does not require pre calculated  "expected results" for the test cases.
 It does not require that there be a unique correct answer.
 It does not assume the existence of a previous version of the program under test that
can be assumed to be correct..
Research about temporal logic specifications has focused on model checking [ 3, 31]
which determines whether it is possible to violate the specification on any execution, but
requires exploration of entire state space . Specification based oracles, on the other hand,
only determine whether a particular execution violates the specification, but do not need
to explore the entire state space . Specification based oracles can be thought of as
consisting of a general purpose oracle procedure for a type of oracle, and  information
specifying desired behavior for specific test case or a specific component under test [25].
Malley et al [22] reported that general approach for specification based oracles is to
convert a formal specification of required behavior into an internal representation (the
oracle information) and then develop the checker for that internal representation(the
oracle procedure). Richardson et al [25] developed an approach to deriving testing
oracles from specification for reactive systems and  incorporated these oracles in the
testing process. This approach is workable for a wide variety of specification formalisms
and, hence, is useable for a variety of application domains, behavioral aspects, and
computational paradigms. They derive test oracles from multi specification and
18
compose these multiple oracles to check test results for behavioral correctness. In
addition they couple oracle derivation with testing and represent an oracle for each test
class specified by the testing criteria in use. They also examine the associated monitoring
needs. To enable comparison to test results to specification based oracles, their approach
hinges on a mapping between the abstract specification and the concrete implementation.
2.4 Intelligent Flight Control Project
 
In this section we describe the   case study  considered  in the thesis. In life-
critical and mission-critical applications, it is important to make provisions for fault
tolerance to take into account a wide range of contingencies. Whereas fault tolerance is
usually equated with duplication-based redundancy, in this project, the team chose to
adopt an approach based on analytical redundancy. Analytical redundancy relies on
relations that hold naturally between system variables, and attempt to exploit them for the
purposes of fault tolerance.  The following observations  support our analytical
redundancy approach:
 U.S. Air Force accident reports regularly report cases where an aircraft has crashed
after losing control surfaces, despite having the physical means to fly on and land
safely [17,18,19].
 In a non-fatal accident that occurred at DFW in March 1997, the aircraft (a Boeing
767) lost 18 feet of the right outboard flap, but the pilot could regain control and land
it safely by using the left aileron [20].
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 It is widely believed, from accident reports, that the fatal accident of Alaska Airlines
Flight 261 (an MD-80) on January 31, 2000, could have been averted despite the loss
of stabilizer controls, had the pilot used the other controls appropriately.
All these instances show that it is possible for a flight to survive the loss of some
flight surfaces, or the loss of control over some flight surfaces. The key, it seems, is to
recognize that these losses produce a different control law, and to operate the aircraft
according to the new law. Of course, the range of possible control laws that result from
the losses is infinite, and ranges over a continuum -hence it is unrealistic to expect pilots
to be exhaustively trained on these. In this project, a Flight Control System (FCS) that is
fault tolerant with respect to sensor faults has been considered.
 2.4.1 The Issue of Certification
A major issue in the use of these adaptive fault-tolerant FCSs is certification.
Current practices rely heavily on testing. For example, the  Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) standard for avionics software uses the modified condition
decision coverage (MC/DC) criteria, which is based on demonstrating, for each branch in
the software, that each parameter can independently affect the result. While this is less
demanding than full branch condition coverage, it presents a huge cost overhead for large
avionics systems. Boeing estimates that 40% of the software development costs for the
777 were spent on testing.1 Hence, testing to this standard has become a major cost driver
in the development of new aircraft. One consequence is that alternatives for flight
                                                          
1
 The total development cost for the B777 was $5 billion.  Approximately half of this was software
development with roughly a billion dollars spent on software testing.
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software certification could enable a significant reduction in the cost of flight control
software development.
At the same time, this form of testing has a number of important limitations. First,
it is accepted in software engineering that “for complex systems, testing can never
demonstrate correctness; it can only be used to reveal errors.”2  Second, criteria such as
MC/DC are based on the structure of the code, and hence may not uncover problems
associated with missing or incorrect requirements; neither can they uncover systemic
problems to do with the interaction between components. Finally, these criteria are
meaningless for new software technologies, including adaptive controllers . For these
types of systems, alternative certification methodologies are needed, based on a
combination of mathematical proof and testing to system and performance requirements.
2.4.2 Avionics Software Certification Issues
 As  mentioned in the section
 
2.4.1
 
 certification is the   major issue in avionics
software. In this section we will  discuss the previous work done on the  certification
standards. Certification can be defined as an official assessment of equivalence between
the specified and the actual service provided by the software and/or system [27]. There
are basically two ways of certifying an embedded software-based system: the indirect
“process certification” and the promising “product certification”. Process certification is
an indirect way of certification. It works as follows:
 The certifier and the developer agree on a development methodology, the
stringency of which is a function of the criticality of software,
                                                          
2
 E. W. Dijkstra, quoted from “Art of Software Testing,” by Glenford J. Myers, (February 1979), Jon Wiley
& Sons; ISBN: 0471043281
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 This methodology is applied by the developer,
 The certifier checks that the methodology is effectively applied.
Process certification is the core of current standards for software certification. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other federal agencies, such as the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Food and Drugs Administration (FDA), have chosen
to perform software certification using a technique similar to that used for certifying
hardware. The basic message of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
document RTCA/DO-178A [23], for example, “is that designers must take a disciplined
approach to software: requirements definition, design, development, testing,
configuration management, and documentation.” There are two observations leading to
conclusion that process certification is insufficiently rigorous for intelligent flight control
systems:
1. General observation: Software engineering techniques for building and validating
software for complex embedded systems so that it adheres to stringent safety and
reliability requirements are the subject of permanent improvements and represent
open research problems.
2.
 Specific observation: Intelligent flight control systems or, more generally, systems
built by any soft computing paradigm, are adaptive; i.e., they change over time.
While this is one of the basic reasons behind the technical appeal of soft
computing platforms, it implies that process certification procedures are
inadequate. In other words, the adequacy of the process does not imply the
adequacy of the system, since the system will change over time.
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For flight control systems, certification is a mandatory process that must be completed
before commissioning the product. The benefits are evident. Product certification is
defined as the direct assessment of the adequacy of the actual service versus the specified
service. Software product certification, shown in Figure 2, comprises of  three steps:
1.
 
Precise identification, at the specification level, of the functional characteristics of
software and of the non- functional attributes necessary for its intended use:
reliability, maintainability, security, etc.
2.
 Measurement (quantitative) and examination (qualitative) of the same functional
attributes at the specification, software (product) and service level.
3.
 
Multi-dimensional assessment of the equivalence between the two sets of
attributes.
Figure 2: Software Product Certification
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For neural network based flight control schemes,  theoretical foundations for
product certification have yet to be established. The basic principles governing the
software life cycle processes for aircraft control systems, laid down in the RTCA/DO-
178B document, were designed with the traditional (algorithm) computing paradigm in
mind. In spite of traditional computing paradigm there are some strengths that are
associated with RTCA/DO-178B. Also, the adaptive ("non programmed") flight control
software requires rethinking or modification of certification procedures proposed in this
certification standard. The strengths of DO-178B can best be summarized as follows:
 Development process for the DO-178B is well defined and orderly explained.
 Constraints and standards (for requirement, design, and coding) can impact
verification effort.
 Organization and tracking tools mention in the DO-178 B can significantly
increase efficiency.
 Automation can significantly speed up paper dependent processes.
 As the process of certification by DO-178B is systematic, generally high
quality product can be produced.
Limitations of existing certification standards are:
DO-178B has been scrutinized as a standard, and a number of weaknesses have been
reported. Some of the well-known limitations include:
 Lack of examples/suggestions creates difficulty for first time developers (but
they are not intended audience anyway).
 Compliance with guidelines requires an extensive effort.
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 No standardized tools have emerged, and some of the existing tools can be
harmful.
 Time and money to learn new tools are substantial and should be planned for.
 People involved with the output from the tools must understand the tools,
which is not always simple to achieve.
 Evidence supporting that an objective is achieved not clearly identified.
FAA identified further limitations of DO-178B:
 Inadequate and ambiguous guidance for requirement definition and analysis.
 Inadequate guidance for partitioning.
 Inadequate guidance for verification activities (adequacy of coverage criteria,
suitable analysis techniques…).
 Inadequate guidance on COTS software.
 Inadequately addresses the effect of software to the safety of the overall
system.
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Chapter 3
Relational Approach to Software Specification
3.1 Relational Background
Relation is a set of tuples. If the set consists entirely of pairs (2-tuples), the
relation is known as binary relation. The set of values that appears as the first element of
pair in a binary relation is called the domain of the relation. The set of values appearing
as the second element of a pair is called the range of a relation. A binary relation on set S
is a subset of S Χ S. Let (s,s') be an element of relation R . Then s is said to be an
antecedent in R , while s' is said to be an image in R. The set of images of s in relation R
is denoted by s• R,  and set of antecedents of element s by relation R is denoted by R• s.
The set of all the antecedents of relation  R  is called the domain of relation R and
denoted by
     dom(R)=
 { s  ∃s':(s,s')∈ R)}
The set of all images of relation R is called the range of relation R, and denoted by
            rng(R)=
 
 { s  ∃t:(t,s')∈ R)}
Among the  relations on a set following relations are important:
 Universal Relation: defined as  S Χ S  and denoted by L(S).
 Identity Relation:  defined as { (s,s') s∈ S ∧ s'=s} and denoted by I(S).
 Diversity Relation:  defined as L(S)/I(S) and denoted by V(S).
 empty relation:  defined as the empty set and denoted by φ(s).
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As a relation is a set, we can perform on relations all the set theoretical operations, such
as complement, intersection, and union. In addition, we define the product of two
relations R and R’ as
}.')',(),(:|)',{(' RstRtstssRR ∈∧∈∃=
Constant relations on S include the empty relation, and the full relation. Heterogeneous
relations, from a set A to  set B, can be defined similarly, and could in fact be considered
as relations on S, for
S = A ∪ B.
Predicate is a template that describes a property of objects or relationship among objects
represented by the variables. More rigorously, a predicate is a  relation. Large and
complex sentences are constructed in predicates by using the connectives. Though there
are many connectives the five basic connectives are NOT, AND, OR, IF-THEN (or
IMPLY), IF-AND-ONLY_IF. They are also denoted by the symbols :¬, ∧, ∨,  → and ↔
respectively. A predicate with variable can make a proposition by applying one of the
following two options to each of the variables:
 assign a value to the variable,
 quantify the variable using a quantifier.
In general,  quantification is performed on formulas of predicate logic, such as p(x) by
using quantifiers on variables. There are two types of quantifiers: universal quantifier and
existential quantifier.
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3.1.1 Universal Quantifier
The expression 
 
 ∀x p(x)  denotes the universal quantification of the p(x).
Translated  into English language, the expression is understood as "For all x, p(x) " or
"For every x, p(x)".  ∀  is called the universal quantifier and  ∀x means all the objects x
in the universe. If this is followed by p(x)  then the meaning is that p(x) is true for objects
x in the universe (set of objects of interest) i.e. domain of the individual variables. If all
the elements in the universe of discourse can be listed then the universal quantification
∀x p(x)  is equal to the conjunction : p(x1) ∧p(x2)........∧p(xn).
3.1.2 Existential Quantifier
 
The expression ∃x p(x), denotes the existential quantification of p(x). Translated
into the English language, the expression could also be understood as : "There exists an x
such that p(x) " or "There is at least one x such that p(x) ". ∃  is called the existential
quantifier and ∃x means at least one object  x in the universe. If this is followed by p(x)
then the meaning is that p(x) is true for at least one object of the universe.  If all the
elements in the domain of interest can be listed then the existential quantification
 ∃x p(x)
is equivalent to the disjunction:  p(x1) ∨ p(x2)........ ∨ p(xn).
 A variable in a predicate is said to be bound if either a specific value is assigned to it or
it is quantified. If a variable is not bound, it is called  a free variable. The extent of the
application  of a quantifier is called the
 scope of the quantifier and is indicated by square
brackets [ ]. If there are no square brackets, then the scope is understood to be smallest
well formed formula following the quantification.
For example, in  ∃x p(x,y)  the variable x   is bound while y is free.
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In 
 ∀x [ ∃y p(x,y) ∨ Q(x,y)], x and the y in p(x,y) are bound while y in Q(x,y) is free,
because the scope of  ∃y is p(x,y). The scope of  ∀x is  [ ∃y p(x,y) ∨ Q(x,y)] .
3.1.3 Order of Application of Quantifiers
When more than one variable is quantified,  such as in  ∃y∀x p(x,y) ,  quantifiers
are applied from the inside, that is one closest to the atomic formula is applied first. Thus
∃y∀x p(x,y)    reads ∃y[∀x p(x,y)]  and we say for some y, p(x,y) holds for every x. The
positions of the same type of quantifiers can be switched without affecting the truth value
as long as there are no quantifiers of the other type between the ones to be interchanged.
For example   ∃x ∃y ∃z p(x,y,z) is equivalent to ∃y ∃x ∃z p(x,y,z) etc .  It is the same for
the universal quantifiers. However, the positions of different types of quantifiers can not
be switched for example  ∃x∀y p(x,y) is not equivalent to ∃y∀x p(x,y)  . Let p(x,y)
represent x<y for the set  of natural numbers as the universe, then ∃x∀y p(x,y) reads  "for
every number x there is a number y that is greater than x" which is true , while ∃y∀x
p(x,y)   reads "there is a number y that is greater than any number", which is not true.
3.2 Relational Software Specification
At the system level, requirements specifications represents an abstraction of the
system behavior. They contain all the required features of system, without involving any
details about their implementation. The fundamental role played by the correct
specification of the system requirements in the design process has been widely addressed
in literature :
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" ......No other part of the work so cripples the resulting system if done wrong. No other
part is as difficult to rectify later...."[38] "..... requirement inadequacies play a major and
expensive role in the project failure" [7].
 Requirements specifications are also a means of communication between customer,
designer and verifier. In order to be a good means of communication they should be
unambiguous. Furthermore, they should be maintainable, since they are often refined
over time. Use of plain English requirements does not allow to have unambiguous
maintainable requirements. This reinforces the need of formal specification language
with a well defined syntax and semantic. The formal approach we will be using is based
on the predicate logic[1] and relational algebra [14] .
 Relational Algebra provides the framework for formal approach to requirements
specification. Relations are set, besides union and intersection operators there are other
operators that are more specific to relations. Among them, join and meet are important.
Join  represents the sum of requirement information and meet represents the common
requirement information. Furthermore it is possible to define an ordering among relations
to measure the relative strength of requirements. This ordering is called refinement. A
relation is said to  refine another relation if it has a larger domain and has a smaller image
set on a common domain.
   The refinement relation is abbreviated by  and the join is
denoted by .
3.2.1 Specifying with Relations and their Exploitation in Testing
 Generally, programs read input data from some input file or device, process it and
return the results onto some output file or device. The input space of a program is  the set
of inputs that the program may read in. The output space  of a program is the set of
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outputs. The internal space  is the set of values that the program's variables may take
during the execution. Th input and input operations of program perform mapping from
the input space to the program's internal space and from the  program's internal space to
the output spaces [12].  Most importantly one needs to  take into consideration the state
transformation taking place in the execution of the program, i.e., relation between initial
states (presumably the states after the input is read) and final state (presumably the state
before the output is written). Specification can be defined if provided with
 A space , say S, typically defined by set declarations.
 A relation on space S , say R, typically defined as set of pairs (s,s') such that
some property holds between s and s'.
Mili et al [13] reported that specification represented by the pair (S,R) prescribes
requirements on a program whose space is S (acting space). The pair (s,s') is in R if
(completeness oblige) and only if (minimality oblige) the user considers that s is a
possible initial state and s' is correct final state for initial state s.  So an implementation P is
said to be correct with respect to specification R on S if and only if P is defined for all inputs in
the domain of R, and for each such an input, P returns a value s’ such that (s, s’) ∈ R.  For any
initial state s, there may exist more than one final state s' in s•R;  R is arbitrarily non-
deterministic and if the space S of a specification (S,R) is implicit from the context, the
specification may be represented by the relation R alone. So, modeling the specification
by relational algebra provides the following benefits:
  unambiguous means of communication between domain experts and specifiers
   pre-check of the requirements within the prose to relations translation process
  capturing of requirements in a traceable manner.
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  composition of the requirements.
 checking for completeness and minimality of the requirements.
Below is the example showing the conversion of prose requirement into relational
requirement. Prose requirement is
" The incremental slideslip angle shall not exceed 2 degrees from the trimmed values and
lateral acceleration shall not exceed 0.03 g while at steady bank angle up to maneuver
bank angle limit reached during normal maneuver with the AFCS engaged"
The relational requirement for this statement  is
MSBT=
            turb( ): time_type → Boolean;
            φ( ): time_type  → angle_type;
            βtrim: angle_type
Constant terms
         Acc
 φ =1:[degree] angle_type;
         Ay_max= 0.02: [g] accerleration_type;
         ∆βmax =1:[degree] angle_type;
Quantified terms
          t1,t2,t3 :time_type;
Auxiliary terms
    none
RSLF= { (m,c)   ∀t1,t2 :t1<t2(
                   ∀t
 
:t1≤ t ≤ t2(
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                              turb(t )=OFF Λ φt≤ Accφ)⇒
        β(t)-βtrim ≤ ∆βmax ΛAy(t)≤ Ay_max)}
Each  formal requirement  is supplemented with a header that introduces monitored,
controlled, constant, auxiliary and quantified variables/values used in the specification.
The domain (MRAH) and range (RAH) are specified in terms of monitored and
controlled variables, respectively. Note in this case , there are only constant and
quantified terms. Constant terms are constant quantities used within specification; their
value is specified along with their declaration. Quantified terms are quantified variables
needed within the specification and listed in the header in order to specify their type.
Auxiliary terms are used to specify the notation,  none in this case.
3.2.2 Relational Specification for Testing and Treatment of Quantifiers in Testing
Requirements represent ideal (correct) functionality of the system. But
implementation of the requirements could results in different functionality of the system.
So the concern over here is to establish whether implementation meets the requirements.
This is achieved by testing in which the correctness of an output of the system is checked
by the oracle built from relational specifications.  Figure 3 demonstrates how relational
specification are used in verification frame.
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 It is always  better to defined the prose requirements in the intermediate notation. The
goal of defining the requirements in an intermediate notation is to gain precision and
understanding. Additional level of formalism allows more accurate analysis of the
specification and highlights any existing ambiguity and/ or error. Then intermediate
requirements are translated into formal relational representation. Then finally use formal
specification are used as oracles, in the testing framework to check whether the
FCS military
requirements
(prose)
Intermediate formulation
(prose like)
Formal relational specification
Verification framework
Quantification
of reliability
Flight
testing data
formalization
used as oracles
Figure 3: Use of Relational Specification for Testing
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implementation of the system fulfill the requirements. Circles in the figure represent
process inputs and outputs while rectangles represent data processing.
It has been discussed above that quantifiers help to convert prose specifications
into relational specifications which, in turn, is used as testing oracle to check the
correctness of the application. But there are issues that need to be considered before using
relational specification as testing oracle. Quantifiers, i.e., ∀ and ∃, used in relational
specifications deals with  time .Generally, time is not necessarily a main issue    when
dealing with relational specification but in the our system specification time is  an
inherent component because in our case study we are dealing with intelligent flight
control system. In intelligent control system at each time interval the control system takes
the snapshot of the sensor readings, process them and compute the actuator values and
then waits for the next time interval to do the same. As in this  case study we are studying
a flight control system, which is a real time application, the issue of ∀ and ∃ quantifiers
with respect to time is quite important. So in following discussion we are  emphasizing
the treatment of time with respect to the quantifiers.
3.3 Quantifiers with respect to time
In the specifications (Appendix B) time is considered  continuous. But to make it
practical in the sense of testing we have to consider it as a discrete variable.  Considering
continuous time   results in trajectories that require only single input record and single
output record as the result of processing. The  data structure produced after considering
continuous time shown in the Figure 4.
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where tstart is the starting time and tend is the end time
To use the relational specification as a testing oracle, a record like this used as an
input to the fault tolerant capability requirement does not make  sense. It is not feasible to
meaningfully evaluate program correctness   on a single record representing a potentially
long trajectory. In this scenario testing quantified variables does not have well defined
meaning due to single slot of time and  single record of input and output variable. By
considering this issue, thinking of time as a  discrete variable makes more sense.  In this
case there is one input and one output record for each time interval provided by the
program and it is appropriate to test all these records according to the preview criteria.
To consider time as a discrete variable, flight simulator can be run off line and result in
timed input/output file for each trajectory. The internal data structure is as shown in the
Figure 5.
Input record 0
Output record 0
Input Record 1
Output record 1
… Input record  i
Output record i
Input record i+1
Output record i+1
… Input record n
Output record n
tstart tend
Input
Output
Figure 5: Input/Output Workload to the Relational  Specification
Figure 4:  Data Structure After Considering  Continuous Time
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 Value of inputs (i.e. parameters representing sensor readings) and output (i.e.
control commands) variables for every time interval dt are stored in a slot of data
structure. The data structure shown in the Figure 5 is input to test oracle representing
fault tolerant capability tolerant block in the figure 6. This blocks checks whether the
value of output produced by the simulator, providing  input parameters representing
sensor readings to the simulator,  is within  the domain delimited by those requirements
and produces a boolean result according to that . List of all the relational specification is
provided in the Appendix.  Most of  these specifications show the involvement of both
quantifiers universal  and existential, generally, in all of the relations universal quantifiers
refer to time quantities only. The general format ∀t
 
: q(t
 
)  where q(t) is a condition.
 In terms of file structure, these quantifiers refer to distinct (input/output) slots in the test
data file. Upon assuming this, in quite a general case a relation assume the form
{ (m,c)   ∀t1,t2......tk q(t1,t2......tk  )⇒ p}
where q is a condition on time and p is a predicate on state variables.
Each of such relations is used as an oracle to test whether the system satisfies the
requirement. This is done by analyzing q(t1,t2......tk ) on the  test file by checking in which
slots a  particular condition is true   and then  marking the slots where predicate is true by
Flight Simulator Test Oracle Representing
Fault Tolerant Capability
Requirements
Flight maneuver Flight
Data
Verification results
Figure 6: A Framework for FCS Verification
37
retrieving the appropriate entries from the file.  For the universal quantifier the if the test
succeeds for all values (and fail for none)  then it can be deduced that (m,c) satisfies the
oracle.
The treatment of existential  with respect to time are handled by translating them to
universal quantifiers by the relation.
  ∃t : p(t) is equivalent to  ¬ ∀t : ( ¬p(t))  .
 The issues that need further attention is the number of input/output in the test data file
(i.e. basically the size of the population) and the  time interval between two data points.
3.3.1 Issue of  Time Intervals
 
The choice of the value of time interval (dt) (shown  in the above Figure 4)
determines the time scale. It has to be handle differently and carefully with respect to
both  existential   and  universal quantifiers. In every time slot in the Figure 4 , the
concern is the true and false value of predicate with respect to both existential   and
universal quantifier. So there are four cases that need to be considered
    3.3.1.1 true value of predicate in at least one slot with respect to existential quantifier.
    3.3.1.2 false value of predicate in every slot with respect to existential quantifier.
    3.3.1.3 false  value of predicate in every slot with respect to  universal quantifier.
    3.3.1.4 true value of predicate in every slot with respect to universal quantifier.
let's consider these cases one by one
3.3.1.1  true value of predicate in at least one slot with respect to existential quantifier :
When dealing with existential quantifier the  concern is to find at least one value from the
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entire domain that satisfies certain condition or criteria. If there is chance of finding at
least one value in the entire domain, the predicate is true against the testing oracle so the
issue of time interval in no more an issue in testing.
3.3.1.2  false value of predicate in every slot with respect to existential quantifiers  :
Consider the scenario in the Figure 7 below where in every time slot the value of
predicate against testing oracle is false.
   t0      t0+dt       t0+2dt        t0+3dt    t0+4dt    t0+5dt    t0+6dt     t0+7dt      tend
where, f represents the false value in every slot.
So for the existential quantifier the test fails for all the values, it can be deduced
that the relation does not satisfy the oracle which may or may not be the case in real
sense. The reason for that is explained  in   Figure 8 .
   t0         t0+dt      t0+2dt      t0+3dt    t0+4dt       t0+5dt    t0+6dt        t0+7dt      tend
In the figure above * represents the points at which the value picked to test the oracle
from each time slot and horizontal dark line (              )  represents the time interval from
f    f f f f f f f
  
         *                *          *    *    * *       *          *
Figure 7 : False Value of the Predicate in Every Slot of the Input/Output File With
 Respect to Existenial Quantifier.
Figure 8 : False Value Pick From Each Slot
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where no value is picked. As we are dealing with existential quantifier, concern is to find
a single true value, to consider the relation satisfy the oracle, so the probability of true
value falling between the two *  points, i.e., on the horizontal solid line is more if the
length of the time interval is more as compared to considering a small interval of time for
that particular time.
3.3.1.3  False value of predicate in at least one time slot with respect to universal
quantifier : The issue of time interval is not a concern when there is possibility of finding
at least one time slot where the predicate is false. One can immediately deduced that
relation does not satisfy the oracle.
3.3.1.4 True value of predicate in all the time slot with respect to universal quantifier: As
the value of predicate in each slot is true one can think that predicate satisfies the oracle
which  may or may not true in reality. In this case we are also looking for at least  a slot
where the value of predicate should be false. So if the time interval between the two slots
is more there is more chance of falling that false value into the interval which is not
considered for testing.
 So the issue basically is when the value of predicate is false in every slot with
respect to   existential quantifier and true in every slot with respect to the universal
quantifier. So in these situation have to check the nature of variables, as these variables
are domain specific need the expertise of the domain expert for making a decision
regarding the time interval for those quantifiers. After getting information from the
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domain expert regarding the nature of the variable in question we can use the Shannon
theorem to come up the value of the time interval for particular variable.
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Chapter 4
Case Study and Results
A certification procedure includes precise identification, at the specification level,
of the functional characteristics of software and of the non-functional attributes necessary
for its intended use: reliability, maintainability, security, etc.  It must proceed with
measurement (quantitative assessment) and examination (qualitative assessment) of the
same functional attributes at the specification, software (product) and service level.
Therefore, a multi-dimensional assessment of the equivalence between the two sets of
attributes must be a part of any certification environment.  The assessment process
proceeds by comparing specified service with actual value for qualitative factors.  Figure
9 shows the general outline of the certification environment.
Requirements
 Equivalent
4.1 Quantitative Assessment
Measurement is inherently the result of quantitative analysis. Quantitative
analysis is the determination of the values of the quality factor of an object. This can be
Figure 9: An Outline of the Certification Environment
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achieved by assigning a number to each quality factor. This assignment has to be done so
that relations between objects are mapped homomorphically onto real numbers.
For all this, a quality model is required as basis. This quality model defines and
decomposes the relevant quality factor and determines their interrelations. For description
and measurement of specified service formal and semi-formal methods have been used.
Structural analysis methods provide an intermediate level of formalism in the
specification. Structured analysis supports the completeness and coherence verification
but it doesn’t support proofs of correctness. For purposes of measurement of the specified
services of this system executed  equivalent of the specification was used.
4.2 Qualitative Assessment
Examination is the qualitative analysis and is done by analyzing the description
(textual analysis), interpretation and execution. Textual analysis produces information on
the syntax structure of the object and is conducted through inspection and tools of static
analysis. Interpretation produces information on the algorithm that the object includes.
Applicable methods are inspection, symbolic execution and verification. Execution
requires executable objects and produces information on the dynamic behavior of the
object i.e. on result, operation etc. Methods to be used are those of dynamic analysis.
As indicated in Figure 9,  certification environment includes  measurement and
comparison of the outputs of the specified service, represented by the any executable
version of   the formalized requirements specification, and the outputs of the actual
service. In this study, the actual service was derived from the high fidelity simulation of
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the Beaver aircraft, enhanced to include the specifics of Sensor Failure Detection
Identification Accommodation system, as shown in Figure 10.
4.3 Tools for Testing
 The Flight Dynamics and Controls (FDC) Toolbox, Version 1.2, was used to
study the test case selection and test result interpretation for the system certification. This
package provides graphical software environment for the design and analysis of aircraft
dynamics and control systems, based upon MATLAB® and SIMULINK®. Test case
generation and result interpretation were achieved by utilizing the Beaver Airplane
simulator.  The block diagram of the simulator is shown in Figure 11.
 The top level of  autopilot simulation model contains the following blocks:
 Beaver dynamics links the non-linear aircraft model Beaver to the autopilot
simulation by means of an Simulink input and output block
Figure 10: Inclusion of SFDIA into the Simulation of the Beaver Aircraft
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 Symmetrical  autopilot modes and Asymmetrical autopilot modes contain the
symmetrical and asymmetrical control laws, respectively.
 Actuator and cable dynamics contain linear state space models of the dynamics of the
actuators and the cables from the actuators to the control surfaces as used in the
'Beaver test aircraft.
 Computational delay and limiters takes into account the computational delay in the
evaluation of the control laws  and the input limitations of the actuators.
 Mode controller and Reference signals define switch settings and reference values
used by the control laws.
 Wind and Turbulence determines the component of wind and atmosphere turbulence
in the aircraft's body axes along with the time derivatives of these values.
 Sensors gathers other sensor characteristics and is used to subtract the initial
conditions from the S-function outputs that leave the system Beaver (this is
necessary, because the autopilot control laws are based upon deviations from the
initial values of S-function outputs while the aircraft model itself uses the full
signals).
 Add initial inputs is used to add the initial values of the control inputs to the changes
in control surface deflections according the control laws (again: the aircraft model is
based upon the full signal; the control laws are based upon deviations from the initial
values).
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Figure 11: Top-Level Schema of the Beaver Simulator
4.3.1 Performing Simulations
The set up for performing a simulation is shown in the Figure 12 .By using this
set up we generated various simulations. Before starting the simulation, it is necessary to
define the system parameter in the MATLAB workspace. First of all, "Beaver" requires
the parameter vector GM1, and the parameter matrices AM, EM, and GM2 to be present
in the MATLAB workspace. Next, the initial flight condition must be defined or
computed. One can use ACTRIM to determine the steady flight condition or use
INCOLOAD to load a flight condition from file. If  you are interested in keeping state
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variables from the aircraft model fixed to their initial value can use FIXSTATE option.
After initializing all the variable you can start the simulation.  Monitoring of the
simulation can be done in the graphics window by its time trajectory or by making the
desired plots. After completing the simulation the workspace contains the variables Time,
In and Out.
Figure 12: Block Diagram for Performing Simulation
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4.4 Verification Environment for Fault Tolerant requirement
Fault tolerant requirements are specific for the FCS that has a fault tolerant capability.
These requirements can be further partitioned into two subsets
 Detection and identification requirements and
 Accommodation requirements.
This partition comes from the different input/output spaces of the two subsets, and from
the different roles that they play in the system specifications. Fault detection and
identification requirements are strictly related to fault modes. For each fault mode the
requirements determine input/output regions of detectability and identifiability.
Accommodation requirements address the overall system safety. They have to be
satisfied regardless of whether the Flight Control System has fault tolerant capability or
not.
4.4.1 Testing environment for accommodation requirement:
After providing the  sequence of flight maneuvers to the flight simulator it
produces a time framed inputs/outputs file for each trajectory. A file with such an internal
data structure as shown in the Figure 13.
Input record 0
Output record 0
Input Record 1
Output record 1
… Input record  i
Output record i
Input record i+1
Output record i+1
… Input record n
Output record n
                 Figure 13: File Structure for the Accommodation Testing Data
So  in each time slot we stored input record consist of input vector with 12 variable and
corresponding to that input record there output record with 89 variable described above.
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The framework for accommodation requirement is shown in the Figure 14.
 As we mentioned above that data structure as shown in the Figure 13 is produced  after
running the simulation. This data structure can be considered a suitable input to the
requirement block of the Figure 14.The task of the verification framework is to check
whether the requirements are satisfied on the data produced by the simulator with the
current values of the flight simulator. The requirements are translated from a relational
notation to an executable representation. The use of monotonic operators, most notably of
the join operator as structuring device for our specifications plays an important role in the
verification step:
4.5 Implementation and Results
In this section we discuss one of the  requirement tested by our  i.e. coordination
in steady banked turns.  The prose requirement for that rule is
Flight Simulator Fault Tolerant Capability
Requirements
Flight maneuver Flight
Data
Verification results
Figure 14 : A Framework for FCS Verification
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" The incremental slideslip angle shall not exceed 2 degrees from the trimmed values and
lateral acceleration shall not exceed 0.03 g while at steady bank angle up to maneuver
bank angle limit reached during normal maneuver with the AFCS engaged"
The corresponding relational requirement for that is
Constant terms
         Acc
 φ =1:[degree] angle_type;
         Ay_max= 0.02: [g] accerleration_type;
         ∆βmax =1:[degree] angle_type;
RSLF= { (m,c)   ∀t1,t2 :t1<t2(
                   ∀t
 
:t1≤ t ≤ t2(
                              turb(t )=OFF Λ φt≤ Accφ)⇒
        β(t)-βtrim ≤ ∆βmax ΛAy(t)≤ Ay_max)}
After providing the input condition to the flight simulator the In and Out matrix are
produced for each time slot.  The time interval for producing the result was 0.5 sec and
the simulation was run for  different total  times.  From the
 Out  matrix we were
interested in three variables viz. β, φ and  Ay  which were present at positions 3, 37 and
41, respectively. Rest of the variables ,i.e., Accφ ,  ∆βmax,  Ay_max  in this specification were
constants with the values 1, 1, and 0.02 respectively.  In this specification the turbulence
switch was in the off position. The value of  βtrim is -0.0195 ( 3 variable in xinco).The
above relational specification was implemented in C and the output produced by the
simulation was fed into these  specification to verify the results. From the produced Out
matrix first those columns were selected where the value of the column 37 i.e. φt≤ 1
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and among those columns the condition β(t)-(-0.0195) ≤ 1
 
ΛAy(t)≤ 0.02)} was
checked in terms of boolean variable. If this condition holds for all the columns were
φt≤ 1 then we can say that the simulation was without any fault and if there were some
false values for the condition then the specification is not true against the implementation.
 In the above implementation of coordination in steady banked turns  we were not able to
find any false value against the condition that means that the specified value were same
as the actual value provided by the flight control system.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Future Needs
Software testing is the process of executing a software system to determine
whether it matches its specification and executes in its intended environment. Software
testing is the least understood part of the development process. Most software testing
experts believed testing should be based on the code. This methodology gives the tester
an idea of desired behavior, it does not tell the tester whether software works as specified.
A new testing methodology that resolve this problem is specification based testing.
Despite this, only a small portion of the testing literature deals with specification based
testing issues. In testing, informal specification has limited usefulness but the real
benefits are gained from formal specification. In our study we used the flight control
system requirements which necessitates that rigorous software testing should performed
before deployment. In our study relational notation was used to model the requirement of
generic flight control system. The advantage of relational approach are that the
requirements are partitioned into less complex components. Each component is
separately specified with set of relations. Modeling the specification by relations provides
many advantages, i.e., unambiguous means of communication between domain experts
and specifiers, capturing of requirement in a traceable manner, checking for completeness
and minimality. The relations developed for the system specification include quantifiers,
most typically universal quantifiers and existential quantifiers.
We used the formal aspect of relational notation in a verification framework
where specifications are used as an oracle to test a system implementation. The issue,
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how to deal with time in the relational specification is also discussed.  Value of control
parameters that are input to the test oracle representing fault tolerant capability
requirements are produced by using Beaver Airplane simulator.
The result of the investigation demonstrated that relational specification can be
used as testing oracle to test a system implementation .It was also found that the issue of
time interval  should be handle differently and carefully with respect to both existential
and universal quantifiers.
While dealing with issue of time interval with respect to universal and existential
quantifiers, if know the nature of function, it is possible to determine cost functions by
Shannon theorem  regarding the issue of time interval. Although we use  relational
specification as testing oracle for some of simple relational specification, more case
studies are needed to analyze the role of relational specification as testing oracle.
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Appendix A  (Flight Simulator Inputs and Outputs)
The set of input applied to  and the output produced by the simulator is depicted in the
Figure Appedix1.
Figure Appendix1: First Level of Graphical Simulink
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Simulator Inputs:
There are twelve (scalar) Inport blocks, which means that the system must be accessed
with an input vector of length twelve. This input vector (i.e. the input vector to the system
Beaver) has been defined as:
  u     = [uaero'  uprop'  uwind']'
  uaero = [deltae deltaa deltar deltaf]'
  uprop = [n pz]'
  uwind = [uw vw ww uwdot vwdot wwdot]'
  where
  deltae: elevator deflection [rad]
  deltaa: ailerons deflection [rad]
  deltar: rudder deflection [rad]
  delfaf: flap deflection [rad]
  n     : engine speed [RPM]
  pz    : manifold pressure ["Hg]
  uw    : wind & turbulence velocity along XB-axis [m/s]
  vw    : wind & turbulence velocity along YB-axis [m/s]
  ww    : wind & turbulence velocity along ZB-axis [m/s]
  uwdot : d(uw)/dt [m/s^2]
  vwdot : d(vw)/dt [m/s^2]
  wwdot : d(ww)/dt [m/s^2]
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Input variables which are send to the MATLAB workspace. During simulations, the time-
trajectories of these input variables are recorded in the matrix In in the MATLAB
workspace. The matrix In contains twelve columns and N rows, where N is the number of
time-steps taken during the simulation. The twelve columns correspond with the twelve
elements of the inputvector u, so:
  In == [  u'(t0)  ;  u'(t1)  ;  u'(t2)  ;  ...  ;  u'(tN)  ]
The twelve columns of In therefore correspond with the variables deltae, deltaa, deltar,
deltaf, n, pz, uw, vw, ww, uwdot, vwdot, and wwdot (in this particular order),
respectively.
It is important to notice that the number of outputs which are sent to the MATLAB
workspace by means of To Workspace blocks is considerably larger than the number of
Outport blocks, representing 'S-function outputs' of the system Beaver. The Outport
blocks are needed for connecting other systems to the output-side of the system Beaver,
e.g., systems with models of sensor dynamics, controllers, etc.
By default, the sixteen outputs which were needed to simulate the 'Beaver' autopilot are
connected to Outport blocks. If other output signals are needed by systems
which ought to be connected to Beaver, it is necessary to add more Outport blocks to this
list of 'S-function outputs'. For instance: if you want to examine control laws which use
accelerations as reference signals, these signals must be connected to new Outport blocks
in the first level of Beaver.
Currently, it is not possible to send complete vectors through individual Inport and
Outport blocks in the first level of a graphical system (where they serve to connect
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the graphical system to other SIMULINK systems, or to provide access to the system for
analytical tools such as trim and linearization routines). Inport and Outport blocks in the
first level of graphical SIMULINK(Figure Appendix1)  systems only accept scalar
signals, which is really a serious limitation of SIMULINK!
S-function outputs
The system Beaver can be treated as a black-box model, which needs to be accessed
through its input and output ports only. Beaver currently contains sixteen Outport blocks
in the first level of its graphical block-diagram(Figure Appedix1). These sixteen 'S-
function outputs' form a subset of the 89 outputs which are sent to the MATLAB
workspace (see below). By default, these sixteen outputs are:
  States = V, alpha, beta, p, q, r, psi, theta, phi, xe, ye, H ,
 Rate of Climb =  Hdot
 Rotational Speed = pb/2V, qc/V, rb/2V
 These variables are needed for simulations of the 'Beaver' autopilot, including the linear
state-space models of the dynamics of the control surfaces, steering column/wheel,
cables, and actuators. Other sets of 'S-function outputs' can be implemented only by
editing the system Beaver according to your own wishes.
During simulations, the time-trajectories of all available output signals are sent to the
matrix Out in the MATLAB workspace. The columns of this matrix contain the
time-trajectories of these outputs, numbered as follows:
Out = [x' xdot' ybvel' yuvw' ydl' ypow' yacc' Caero' Cprop' ...
       FMaero' FMprop' Fgrav' Fwind' yatm' yad1' yad2' yad3']'
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x     =                                                   [V alpha beta p q r psi theta phi xe ye H]'      (1...12)
xdot  = dx/dt,                                      {Vabdot, pqrdot, Eulerdot, xyHdot} (13...24)
ybvel = [u v w]'                                  {uvw} (25...27)
yuvw  = [udot vdot wdot]'                  {uvwdot} (28...30)
ydl   = [pb/2V qc/V rb/2V]'                {Dimless} (31...33)
yfp   = [gamma fpa chi Phi]'               {Flpath} (34...37)
ypow  = [dpt P]'                                   {Power}  (38, 39)
yacc  = [Ax Ay Az axk ayk azk]'        {Accel} (40...45)
Caero = [CXa CYa CZa Cla Cma Cna]'            {Aeromod} (46...51)
Cprop = [CXp CYp CZp Clp Cmp Cnp]'          {Engmod} (52...57)
FMaero= [Xa Ya Za La Ma Na]'                       {FMdims} (58...63)
FMprop= [Xp Yp Zp Lp Mp Np]'                    {FMdims} (64...69)
Fgrav = [Xgr Ygr Zgr]'                           {Gravity} (70...72)
Fwind = [Xw Yw Zw]'                           {Fwind} (73...75)
yatm  = [rho ps T mu g]'                        {Atmosph} (76...80)
yad1  = [a M qdyn]'                                {Airdata1} (81...83)
yad2  = [qc Ve Vc]'                                {Airdata2} (84...86)
yad3  = [Tt Re Rc]'                                 {Airdata3} (87...89)
 The numbers of the corresponding columns in the output matrix Out have been put
between round brackets. After finishing a simulation, the time-trajectories, stored in the
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matrix Out can be plotted against the time-axis which is stored in the vector time. For
instance, if you want to plot the nth column of Out, the plot-command looks like:
   plot(time,Out(:,n)) where 1 <= n <= 89. The appropriate value of n can be retrieved
from the list above. It is important to notice that this list represents the default definition
of Out, used in the system Beaver. You may wish to add more outputs, or delete
unwanted outputs from this list, by adding and/or deleting blocks to/from the system. If
you want to plot simulation results by directly using the matrix Out, as demonstrated
above, you need to know the column numbers of the different outputs. However, if your
system uses the same definitions of the matrices In (see the list of input signals) and Out
as the system Beaver, it is also possible to run RESULTS before plotting the results, in
order to get separate time-trajectories of all input and output variables with self-
explaining variable names.
Variable used in the Out Matrix
V        : airspeed [m/s]
alpha    : angle of attack [rad] or [deg]
beta     : sideslip angle [rad] or [deg]
p        : roll-rate [rad/s] or [deg/s]
q        : pitch-rate [rad/s] or [deg/s]
r        : yaw-rate [rad/s] or [deg/s]
psi      : yaw-angle [rad] or [deg]
theta    : pitch-angle [rad] or [deg]
phi      : roll-angle [rad] or [deg]
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xe       : X-coordinate in Earth-axes [m]
ye       : Y-coordinate in Earth-axes [m]
H        : altitude [m]
Vdot     : time-derivative of airspeed [m/s^2]
alphadot : time-derivative of alpha [rad/s] or [deg/s]
betadot  : time-derivative of beta [rad/s] or [deg/s]
pdot     : time-derivative of p [rad/s^2] or [deg/s^2]
qdot     : time-derivative of q [rad/s^2] or [deg/s^2]
rdot     : time-derivative of r [rad/s^2] or [deg/s^2]
psidot   : time-derivative of psi [rad/s] or [deg/s]
thetadot : time-derivative of theta [rad/s] or [deg/s]
phidot   : time-derivative of phi [rad/s] or [deg/s]
xedot    : time-derivative of xe [m/s]
yedot    : time-derivative of ye [m/s]
Hdot     : time-derivative of H [m/s]
u        : component of V along XB-axis [m/s]
v        : component of V along YB-axis [m/s]
w        : component of V along ZB-axis [m/s]
udot     : time-derivative of u [m/s^2]
vdot     : time-derivative of v [m/s^2]
wdot     : time-derivative of w [m/s^2]
pb/2V    : dimensionless roll-rate; b is the wingspan [m]
qc/V     : dimensionless pitch-rate; c is the mean aerodynamic chord [m]
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rb/2V    : dimensionless yaw-rate; where b is the wingspan [m]
gamma    : flightpath angle [rad] or [deg]
fpa      : flightpath acceleration [m/s^2]
chi      : azimuth angle [rad] or [deg]
Phi      : bank angle [rad] or [deg]
dpt      : dimensionless pressure increase across propeller [-]
P        : engine power [Nm/s]
Ax       : specific force along XB-axis [g]
Ay       : specific force along YB-axis [g]
Az       : specific force along ZB-axis [g]
axk      : kinematic acceleration along XB-axis [g]
ayk      : kinematic acceleration along YB-axis [g]
azk      : kinematic acceleration along ZB-axis [g]
CXa      : coefficient of aerodynamic force along XB-axis [-]
CYa      : coefficient of aerodynamic force along YB-axis [-]
CZa      : coefficient of aerodynamic force along ZB-axis [-]
Cla      : coefficient of aerodynamic moment around XB-axis [-]
Cma      : coefficient of aerodynamic moment around YB-axis [-]
Cna      : coefficient of aerodynamic moment around ZB-axis [-]
CXp      : coefficient of engine force along XB-axis [-]
CYp      : coefficient of engine force along YB-axis [-]
CZp      : coefficient of engine force along ZB-axis [-]
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Clp      : coefficient of engine moment around XB-axis [-]
Cmp      : coefficient of engine moment around YB-axis [-]
Cnp      : coefficient of engine moment around ZB-axis [-]
Xa       : aerodynamic force along XB-axis [N]
Ya       : aerodynamic force along YB-axis [N]
Za       : aerodynamic force along ZB-axis [N]
La       : aerodynamic moment around XB-axis [Nm]
Ma       : aerodynamic moment around YB-axis [Nm]
Na       : aerodynamic moment around ZB-axis [Nm]
Xp       : engine force along XB-axis [N]
Yp       : engine force along YB-axis [N]
Zp       : engine force along ZB-axis [N]
Lp       : engine moment around XB-axis [Nm]
Mp       : engine moment around YB-axis [Nm]
Np       : engine moment around ZB-axis [Nm]
Xgr      : gravity force along XB-axis [N]
Ygr      : gravity force along YB-axis [N]
Zgr      : gravity force along ZB-axis [N]
Xw       : wind force along XB-axis [N]
Yw       : wind force along YB-axis [N]
Zw       : wind force along ZB-axis [N]
rho      : airdensity [kg/m^3]
ps       : static pressure [N/m^2]
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T        : temperature [K]
mu       : dynamic viscosity [kg/(m*s)]
g        : acceleration of gravity [m/s^2]
a        : speed of sound [m/s]
M        : Mach number [-]
qdyn     : dynamic pressure [N/m^2]
qc       : impact pressure [N/m^2]
Ve       : equivelent airspeed [m/s]
Vc       : calibrated airspeed [m/s]
Tt       : total temperature [K]
Re       : Reynolds number per unit length [1/m]
Rc       : Reynolds number with respect to mean aerodyn. chord [-]
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Appendix B
This section contains both the plain English and relational   requirements. Each
requirement has an header that introduces mointored, controlled, constant, quantified and
auxiliary  quantities used in the specification.
Requirement 1:  Attitude Hold (pitch and roll)
 Plain English: Attitude shall be maintained Attitudes  in smooth
air with a static accuracy of  ±0.5 degree in pitch attitude (with wings level) and _1:0
degree in roll attitude with respect to the reference. RMS attitude deviations shall not
exceed 5 degrees in pitch or10 degrees in roll attitude in turbulence. Accuracy
requirements shall be achieved and maintained within 5 seconds of mode engagement for
a 5 degree attitude disturbance.
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Requirement 2: Heading Hold
In smooth air, heading shall be maintained within a static accuracy of ±0.5 degree with
respect to the reference. In turbulence, RMS deviations shall not exceed 5 degrees in
heading at the intensities specified in ????. When heading hold is engaged, the aircraft
shall roll towards wings level. The reference heading shall be that heading that exists
when the aircraft passes through a roll attitude that is wings level plus or minus a
tolerance.
Requirement 3: Heading Select
The aircraft shall automatically turn through the smallest angle to any heading selected or
pre selected by the pilot and maintain that heading to the tolerances specified for heading
hold. The contractor shall determine a bank angle limit which provides a satisfactory turn
rate and precludes impending stall. The heading selector shall have 360 degrees control.
The aircraft shall not overshoot the selected heading by more than 1.5 degrees with aps
up or 2.5 degrees with flaps down. Entry into and exit from the turn shall be smooth and
rapid. The roll rate shall not exceed 10 deg/sec and roll acceleration shall not exceed 5
deg/sec/sec.
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Requirement 4: Coordination in steady banked turns
The incremental sideslip angle shall not exceed 2 degrees from the trimmed value, and
lateral acceleration shall not exceed 0.03g, while at steady bank angle up to the maneuver
bank angle limit reached during normal maneuvers with the AFCS engaged.
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Requirement 5: Coordination in straight and level flight
The accuracy while the aircraft is in straight and level flight shall be maintained with an
incremental sideslip angle of _1 degree from the trimmed value or a lateral acceleration
of _0:02 g at the cg, whichever is lower.
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Requirement 6: Altitude hold
 Engagement of the altitude hold function at rates of climb or descent less than 2000 fpm
shall select the existing indicated barometric altitude and control the aircraft to this
altitude as a reference. The resulting normal acceleration shall not exceed 0.2g
incremental. For engagement at rates above 2000 feet per minute the AFCS shall not
cause any unsafe maneuvers. Within the aircraft thrust- drag capability and at steady bank
angles, the mode shall provide control accuracies shown in Table ??. These accuracy
requirements apply for airspeeds up to Mach 1.0. ... Following engagement or
perturbation of this mode at 2000 feet per minute or less, the specified accuracy shall be
achieved within 30 seconds.
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Function used in these specifications
